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FEDERALISM AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: SAFEGUARDING 
THE RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
RACHEL E. ROSENBLOOM1
I.- DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES. II.- STATE AND LOCAL ANTI-
IMMIGRANT INITIATIVES. III.- LEGAL CHALLENGES TO “ATTRITION 
THROUGH ENFORCEMENT” LAWS. IV.- FEDERALISM AND FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS : LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR CHALLENGING ANTI-IMMIGRANT 
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION.
ABSTRACT: In both the United States and Europe, governments have stepped up initiatives to 
reduce unauthorized immigration. Direct immigration control measures such as border security are 
just one aspect of these efforts. Another key aspect consists of indirect immigration control mea-
sures, in the form of laws that restrict the ability of undocumented immigrants to work, study, rent 
property, or access public services.This article reviews recent developments in the United States 
with respect to indirect immigration control measures and maps out some points of comparison 
with analogous developments within the European Union.  It provides an account of the wave of 
state and local anti-immigrant laws that swept the United States between 2006 and 2011 andsum-
marizes the developing U.S. jurisprudence on the constitutionality of these measures. It then offers 
some initial observations comparing the United States to the E.U.  This comparison highlights the 
distinction between approaching anti-immigrant laws through the lens of federalism (or, in the 
terminology more common in Europe, competence) and approaching such laws as violations of 
fundamental rights.
Keywords: Irregular Migrants, Undocumented Immigrants, Federalism, Competence
FEDERALISMO Y DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES: DEFENDER LOS DERECHOS DE 
LOS INMIGRANTES EN SITUACIÓN IRREGULAR EN ESTADOS UNIDOS Y EN LA 
UNIÓN EUROPEA
RESUMEN: Tanto en Estados Unidos como en Europa, se han intensifi cado las iniciativas para 
reducir la inmigración irregular. Las medidas directas de control de la inmigración, por ejemplo 
la seguridad fronteriza, son sólo un aspecto de estos esfuerzos. Otro aspecto clave consiste en 
medidas indirectos de control de la inmigración, en forma de leyes que restringen la capacidad de 
los migrantes irregulares para trabajar, estudiar, alquilar una propiedad, o acceder a los servicios 
públicos. En este artículo se analiza la evolución reciente en los Estados Unidos con respecto a 
las medidas indirectos de control de inmigración y se ofrecen algunos puntos de comparación 
con la evolución análogas dentro de la Unión Europea. El artículo describe la ola de leyes anti-
inmigrantes locales del estado y que se extendió por los Estados Unidos entre 2006 y 2011 y resume 
la jurisprudencia EE.UU. sobre la constitucionalidad de estas medidas. A continuación, ofrece 
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earier draft of  this article; and to Alyssa Telander for her excellent research assistance. 
Federalims and Fundamental Rights : Safeguarding the Rights of  Undocumented Immigrants in the United States
and the European Union
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 4, janvier-décembre 2016, pp. 13-4514
algunas observaciones iniciales que comparaban los Estados Unidos a la E.U. Esta comparación 
pone de relieve la distinción entre acercarse a las leyes anti-inmigrantes a través de la lente del 
federalismo (o, en la terminología más común en Europa, la competencia) y acercarse a esas leyes 
como violaciones de los derechos fundamentales.
Palabras clave: Migración Irregular, Inmigrantes Indocumentados, Federalismo, Competencia 
FÉDÉRALISME ET DROITS FONDAMENTAUX : DÉFENDRE LES DROITS DES 
IMMIGRANTS EN SITUATION IRRÉGULIÈRE AUX ÉTATS-UNIS ET AU SEIN 
L’UNION EUROPÉENNE
RÉSUMÉ : Aux États-Unis comme en Europe, nombreux gouvernements ont intensifi é les ini-
tiatives visant à endiguer l’immigration irrégulière. Les mesures de contrôle direct, tels que les 
contrôles aux frontières, ne forment que l’un des aspects de ces efforts. Un autre aspect clé sont les 
mesures de contrôle indirect, sous forme de lois visant à restreindre l’accès à l’emploi, à l’éduca-
tion, au logement ou aux services publics. Le présent article fait le point de l’évolution  récente aux 
États-Unis des contrôles indirects de l’immigration, et établit les grandes lignes de comparaison 
avec les développements analogues au sein de l’Union Européenne.
L’article offre un compte rendu de la vague de lois, au niveau des États aussi bien qu’au niveau 
local, qui a balayé les États-Unis entre 2006 et 2011, et offre un résumé de la jurisprudence relative 
à la constitutionalité desdites mesures. L’article offre ensuite quelques premières comparaisons 
entre les États-Unis et l’Union européenne. Ces comparaisons mettent en relief les différences dans 
la lutte contre les lois anti-immigration, entre une stratégie fédéraliste d’une part (en Europe, on 
parlera de compétence), et d’autre part, une stratégie visant à révéler ces lois comme contraires aux 
droits fondamentaux des personnes.
Mots clé : Immigration irrégulière, immigrés sans papiers, fédéralisme, compétence.
In both the United States and Europe, governments have stepped up 
initiatives to reduce unauthorized immigration. Direct immigration control 
measures such as border security are just one aspect of  these efforts. Another 
key aspect consists of  indirect immigration control measures, in the form of  
laws that restrict the ability of  undocumented immigrants to work, study, rent 
property, or access public services.2
This article reviews recent developments in the United States with respect 
to indirect immigration control measures and maps out some points of  
comparison with analogous developments within the European Union (E.U.). 
Part I briefl y reviews the evolution of  U.S. immigration policy at the national 
level over the past three decades. Part II provides an account of  the wave 
of  state and local anti-immigrant laws that swept the United States between 
2 While the term “irregular migrant” is used more commonly within Europe, this article 
follows common U.S. practice in using the term “undocumented immigrant” to refer to 
noncitizens who lack authorized immigration status in the country in which they reside. 
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2006 and 2011. Part III summarizes the developing U.S. jurisprudence on the 
constitutionality of  these measures. Part IV offers some initial observations 
comparing the United States to the E.U. This comparison highlights the 
distinction between approaching anti-immigrant laws through the lens of  
federalism (or, in the terminology more common in Europe, competence) 
and approaching such laws as violations of  fundamental rights.
I. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
This section reviews three central issues that have shaped immigrants’ 
rights debates at the national level within the United States over the past three 
decades.  First, U.S. immigration policy has become increasingly focused on 
enforcement, marking a departure from the liberalization of  the 1960s and 
1970s. Secondly, the number of  undocumented immigrants living in the 
United States has grown signifi cantly. And fi nally, although the U.S. Congress 
has considered regularization programs numerous times over the past decade, 
legislators have been deeply divided on the issue and have failed to enact any 
proposed immigration reform legislation.
1. HEIGHTENED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Statutory changes and spending increases have transformed the U.S. 
immigration enforcement system over the past three decades. Immigration 
policy in the United States underwent a number of  progressive reforms in 
the 1960s through early 1980s, including the end of  a racially discriminatory 
system of  national origins quotas in 1965 and the passage of  the Refugee Act 
in 1980.3  However, in the years since then there has been a growing emphasis 
on enforcement. Between 1984 and 2014, the number of  people deported 
annually from the United States increased more than twentyfold, from fewer 
than nineteen thousand per year to more than four hundred thousand per 
3 See MILLER, T.A., “Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the 
New Penology,” Georgetown  Immigration Law Journal. L.J. Vol. 17, 2003, p. 15 (noting that 
“immigration – seen primarily as a civil rights issue during the Civil Rights Era spanning 
the 1960’s and 1970’s – is now seen as a critical issue of  national security”). See generally, 
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, The Growth of  the U.S. Deportation Machine, 2014, <http://
www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/fi les/docs/deportation_machine_march_2014_
fi nal.pdf>.
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year.4 Federal spending on interior immigration enforcement has ballooned, 
particularly in the years since the attacks of  September 11, 2001, with the result 
that federal government now spends more on immigration enforcement than 
on all other federal criminal law enforcement agencies combined.5
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a federal law enacted 
in 1952, governs the admission and expulsion of  noncitizens.6 In 1986, 
Congress amended the INA to include sanctions on employers who hire 
unauthorized workers.  That legislation, the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA),7 is generally viewed as marking the beginning of  the 
current era of  heightened enforcement. The most signifi cant amendments to 
the INA during the past three decades occurred in 1996 with the passage of  
two sweeping laws, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.8 Through 
these statutes, Congress introduced harsh new standards that subject a much 
broader group of  immigrants to deportation, including long-term legal 
residents who had committed relatively minor criminal offenses.9  Congress 
4 See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2014 Yearbook of  Immigration 
Statistics, Table 39, 2016, <https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2014-
enforcement-actions>.
5 See ROSENBLUM, M.R. & KANDEL, W.A. Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting 
Criminal Aliens, Cong. Research Serv., 25 (2012), <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
R42057.pdf>. (documenting increase in federal funding from $960 million in 2004 to nearly 
$2.7 billion by 2013); MEISSNER, D., et. al., Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of  
a Formidable Machinery, Migration Policy Institute, 2013, p. 12 <http://www.migrationpolicy.
org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf  > (reporting that the U.S. government spent $18 billion 
on immigration enforcement in 2013, compared to the combined $14.4 billion it spent on 
the Federal Bureau of  Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Secret Service, the 
U.S. Marshals Service, and the Bureau of  Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms combined).
6 The Immigration and Nationality Act of  1952, Pub.L. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163, codifi ed at 8 
U.S.C.A. § 101 et. seq.
7 Immigration Reform and Control Act of  1986, Pub.L. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3445.
8 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of  1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of  1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
9 For an analysis of  the deportation provisions of  the 1996 immigration laws, see HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, Forced Apart: Families Separated and Immigrants Harmed by United States Deportation 
Policy, 2007, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/07/16/forced-apart/families-separated-
and-immigrants-harmed-united-states-deportation>.
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also curtailed the power of  immigration judges to halt deportations and to 
grant status to individuals on grounds such as hardship and family unity.10 In 
addition, the 1996 laws imposed a new one-year time limit on the fi ling of  
asylum applications, and created lengthy inadmissibility bars for those who 
have spent time in the United States without authorization.11
Federal law does not criminalize the act of  being present in the United 
States without authorization.12 However, it criminalizes a number of  
immigration-related offenses, such as illegal entry, illegal reentry following 
deportation, and the use of  fraudulent documents.13 Prosecution of  such 
crimes has increased dramatically in recent years.14
Another signifi cant development within U.S. immigration enforcement 
has been the increase in cooperation between federal immigration authorities 
and local police departments.  A 1996 amendment to the INA authorized the 
federal immigration agency (then known as the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) and now known as the Department of  Homeland Security 
(DHS)) to deputize local police offi cers to carry out some of  the functions of  
immigration offi cers.15  More recently, cooperation has been achieved through 
the creation of  systems to link data maintained by law enforcement agencies 
with data maintained by DHS.16
10 See id. 
11 For example, those who have been present without authorization for one year or more are 
barred from returning to the United States for ten years.  8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
12 “As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United 
States.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012).
13 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (illegal entry); § 1326 (illegal reentry); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1546 (document 
fraud).
14 See At Nearly 100,000, Immigration Prosecutions Reach All-Time High in FY 2013, TRAC 
Immigration, 2013 <http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/336/>.
15 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(g).
16 Secure Communities, a DHS program launched in 2008, established a system through 
which arrest data from police offi cers around the country is automatically sent to DHS, 
enabling DHS to identify and detain individuals who are deportable. This program was 
modifi ed in 2014 and renamed the Priority Enforcement Program; the new program retains 
the system of  database interoperability but establishes guidelines that are supposed to limit 
detentions to those who commit serious offenses. See Secure Communities, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, <http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities>.
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2. UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION
In 1990, there were approximately 3.5 million undocumented immigrants 
living in the United States.17 That number increased to approximately 12.2 
million by 2007, and then leveled off  at an estimated 11.3 million over the 
last several years.18 Nearly two-thirds of  undocumented immigrant adults in 
the United States have been in the country for at least ten years. 19  There 
are over fi ve million U.S.-citizen children in the United States living with 
undocumented parents.20
There are many factors that have contributed to the growth in the 
population of  undocumented immigrants.  The most obvious factor is an 
increase in unauthorized entries and visa overstays, driven in large part by 
violence, poverty, and political instability in many regions of  the world.  The 
increase is also attributable, however, to changes in U.S. law and policy.  In 
previous eras, those who remained in the United States for long periods 
of  time often transitioned to lawful status through marriage, regularization 
programs, and other means.21 However, Congress has cut off  many of  
these paths to regularization, with the result that many people remain in an 
unauthorized status for decades.  In addition, heightened border security may 
have also, ironically, played a role.  Demographic research has shown that the 
increase in border security has led many unauthorized immigrants to remain 
in the United States for longer periods, ending long-standing patterns of  
circular labor migration, particularly among Mexican immigrants; rather than 
17 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, A Portrait of  Undocumented Immigrants in the United States, 2009, 
<http://www.pewhispanic.org/2009/04/14/a-portrait-of-unauthorized-immigrants-in-the-
united-states/>.
18 PASSEL, J.S. & COHN, D., Unauthorized Immigrant Population Stable for Half  a Decade, 
Pew Research Center, 2015, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/22/
unauthorized-immigrant-population-stable-for-half-a-decade/>.
19 TAYLOR, P., et al., Undocumented Immigrants: Length of  Residency, Patterns of  Parenthood, Pew 
Hispanic Center, 2011, <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/12/01/unauthorized-
immigrants-length-of-residency-patterns-of-parenthood/>. 
20 WARREN, R., U.S.-Born Children of  Undocumented Residents: Numbers and Characteristics in 2013, 
Center for Migration Studies, <http://cmsny.org/publications/warren-usbornchildren/>. 
Children born in the United States are U.S. citizens by virtue of  the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution, regardless of  the status of  their parents.
21 See ROSENBLOOM, R., “Policing the Borders of  Birthright Citizenship: Some Thoughts on 
the New (and Old) Restrictionism,” Washburn Law Journal, Vol. 51, 2012, pp. 326-28.
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risk apprehension through repeated border crossings, many undocumented 
immigrants have settled permanently in the United States.22
3. THE FAILURE TO ENACT COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM 
The United States has a long history of  programs to provide lawful status 
to unauthorized immigrants, dating back to the 1920s.23 The most recent, and 
largest, legalization program occurred in 1986 with IRCA, which provided 
an opportunity for undocumented immigrants who had arrived before 1982 
to become lawful permanent residents.24 Nearly 2.7 million people obtained 
status through IRCA.25
During the administration of  President George W. Bush (2001-2008), a 
bipartisan group of  legislators crafted various proposals for Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform (CIR) – termed “comprehensive” because the proposals 
combined a legalization program with increased border security and a 
guestworker program. CIR bills were debated in Congress in 2006 and 2007 
but opposition from Republican lawmakers led to the defeat of  these bills. A 
new CIR bill was introduced in Congress in 2013 under the administration of  
President Barack Obama, but was also defeated.
Congress has also repeatedly considered passage of  the Development, 
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (the DREAM Act). The 
DREAM Act would provide permanent residence and a path to citizenship 
to unauthorized immigrants who arrived in the United States prior to age 
sixteen, provided they fulfi ll a set of  requirements including graduating from 
high school and pursuing either higher education or military service. The 
DREAM act was introduced a number of  times between 2001 and 2013, 
both as a stand-alone bill and as part of  CIR bills. However, it failed to garner 
enough votes for passage.
22 See DURAND, J. & DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, D.S. (eds), Crossing the Border: Research from the Mexican 
Migration Project, 2004, p. 12.
23 See BOSWELL, R.A. “Crafting an Amnesty with Traditional Tools: Registration and 
Cancellation,” Harvard Journal on Legislation, Vol. 47, 2010, pp. 180-95.
24 Immigration Reform and Control Act of  1986, Pub.L. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3445.
25 CHISHTI, M. AND KAMASAKI, C., IRCA in Retrospect: Guideposts for Today’s Immigration Reform, 
Migration Policy Institute, 2014, p. 6, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/irca-
retrospect-immigration-reform>.
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In 2012, President Obama invoked his executive authority to initiate a 
program called Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which 
provides temporary relief  to many of  those who would have obtained lawful 
status through the DREAM Act. Although a true legalization program that 
would provide permanent resident status and a path to citizenship must be 
enacted by Congress, the executive branch of  government has traditionally 
exercised its discretion to decide whom to prioritize for deportation. 
Consistent with this discretion, it has for decades followed a practice of  
granting “deferred action” to some individuals for humanitarian or other 
reasons.  Deferred action, somewhat like the toleration status that exists is 
many European countries (for example, Duldung status in Germany), provides 
an individual with temporary protection from deportation.  It also provides 
temporary employment authorization. DACA established a system to 
provides renewable two-year grants of  deferred action to those who entered 
the United States before the age of  16 and who, as of  June 15, 2012, were 
under the age of  31 and had resided in the United States for at least fi ve years, 
provided that at the time of  application they are in school, have completed 
secondary school, or have been honorably discharged from the military.26 In 
2014, President Obama announced a signifi cant expansion of  this program, 
broadening the eligibility for DACA and creating a new program called 
Deferred Action for Parents of  Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(DAPA), which would provide deferred action to undocumented immigrants 
who have been present in the United States since 2010 and have a son or 
daughter who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.27
Over seven hundred thousand people have already received deferred 
action through DACA. These individuals do not have legal status (that is, 
a visa) but they do have lawful presence and employment authorization, 
which has led some to refer to them as “DACAmented,” a play on the term 
“documented.”  It is estimated that with the 2014 expansion of  eligibility 
for DACA and the creation of  DAPA, the total number of  people eligible 
26 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Consideration of  Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA), <https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-
childhood-arrivals-daca>. 
27 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Executive Actions on Immigration,  <https://www.
uscis.gov/immigrationaction>.
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for deferred action under these programs could rise to over fi ve million.28 
However, Republican elected offi cials have voiced fi erce opposition to the 
plan and have accused President Obama of  exceeding his power under the 
Constitution, and governors and attorneys general from twenty-six states 
sued to block the program.  In February, 2015, a federal judge in Texas issued 
a temporary injunction that blocked the implementation of  the program on 
the grounds that DHS had failed to follow proper administrative procedures 
in promulgating the regulations that govern DAPA and the expanded DACA 
program.29  This decision was affi rmed by a federal court of  appeals30 and 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.31 The litigation is ongoing32 and it is possible 
that it will end up on appeal before the Supreme Court again at a later date, 
but implementation of  the program has been blocked at least for now. 
With DAPA and the expanded DACA program currently on hold, and with 
Congress showing no inclination to pass any sort of  legalization bill, it is 
likely that the number of  undocumented immigrants in the United States 
who are vulnerable to deportation will remain high for quite some time.
II. STATE AND LOCAL ANTI-IMMIGRANT INITIATIVES 
With Congress divided over how to respond to the issue of  unauthorized 
immigration, lawmakers at the state and local level have taken action on 
their own through passage of  a variety of  state laws, local ordinances, and 
resolutions. Some of  these measures have aimed to assist undocumented 
immigrants (for example, by making undocumented students eligible for 
the reduced tuition rates enjoyed by state residents at public universities). 
28 MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, As Many as 3.7 Million Unauthorized Immigrants Could Get 
Relief  from Deportation under Anticipated New Deferred Action Program, 2014, <http://www.
migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-many-37-million-unauthorized-immigrants-could-get-relief-
deportation-under-anticipated-new> (estimating that the 2014 changes would add 3.7 million 
people to the estimated 1.5 million who are already eligible for the original DACA program 
that was announced in 2012). 
29 Texas v. U.S., 86 F.Supp. 3d 591, 672 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
30 Texas v. U.S., 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2016).
31 U.S. v. Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2271 (2016). 
32 The Obama administration fi led a petition on July 18, 2016 seeking rehearing by the 
Supreme Court.  In addition, the case may end up being reviewed once again by the Court 
of  Appeals and the Supreme Court at a later stage in the litigation. 
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However, most have been aimed at discouraging unauthorized immigration 
by placing restrictions on undocumented immigrants in areas such as housing, 
employment, and public services.
This section fi rst outlines the framework of  state-federal power-sharing 
set forth by the U.S. Constitution and Supreme Court jurisprudence.  It then 
describes the wave of  anti-immigrant legislation enacted between 2006 and 
2011. 
1. FEDERAL POWER OVER IMMIGRATION
Under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, subfederal units of  
governments – states, counties, and municipalities – lack the authority to 
regulate immigration directly. In 1875, the Supreme Court declared in Chy 
Lung v. Freeman that the regulation of  immigration is a matter of  exclusive 
federal control.33  Chy Lung concerned a California law that authorized a state 
offi cial to inspect arriving immigrants, to deny entry on various grounds, and 
to require immigrants deemed to be a risk of  becoming a public charge to 
pay a sum of  money intended to compensate the state if  the person ended 
up relying on public benefi ts.  The Supreme Court held that this law violated 
the Constitution. In reaching this decision, the Court reasoned that foreign 
governments would take offense at the law, and would bring their concerns 
not to California but to the federal government: 
Upon whom would such a claim be made? Not upon the State of  
California; for, by our Constitution, she can hold no exterior relations with 
other nations. It would be made upon the government of  the United States. 
If  that government should get into a diffi culty which would lead to war, or to 
suspension of  intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union? If  we 
should conclude that a pecuniary indemnity was proper as a satisfaction for the 
injury, would California pay it, or the Federal government? If  that government 
has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any foreign nations, or to 
declare war, and has taken the whole subject of  these relations upon herself, has 
the Constitution, which provides for this, done so foolish a thing as to leave it 
in the power of  the States to pass laws whose enforcement renders the general 
government liable to just reclamations which it must answer, while it does not 
prohibit to the States the acts for which it is held responsible?34
33 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
34 Id. at 279-80.
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The Court concluded that “[t]he passage of  laws which concern the 
admission of  citizens and subjects of  foreign nations to our shores belongs 
to Congress, and not to the States. [Congress] has the power to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the character of  those 
regulations, and for the manner of  their execution, belongs solely to the 
national government. If  it be otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, 
embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations.”35
The federal government’s powers are limited to those enumerated in the 
Constitution, with all other powers being reserved “to the States, respectively, 
or to the people.”36  While the Court in Chy Lung did not specify which section 
of  the U.S. Constitution gives the federal government exclusive jurisdiction 
over immigration to the federal government, later cases have cited Article I, 
which gives the federal government the power to “establish an Uniform Rule 
of  Naturalization.”37
The exclusively federal nature of  the power to regulate immigration does 
not mean, however, that states have no role to play. The Supreme Court held 
in a 1976 case, De Canas v. Bica, that “standing alone, the fact that aliens are 
the subject of  a state statute does not render it a regulation of  immigration, 
which is essentially a determination of  who should or should not be admitted 
into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may 
remain.”38 In cases involving indirect restrictions on immigrants, the Court 
held, a subfederal law will be struck down only if  1) Congress has clearly 
indicated its intent to preclude state or local legislation in a particular area of  
legislation, 2) Congress has “occupied the fi eld” by creating a comprehensive 
legislative scheme that leaves no room for state legislation, or 3) a subnational 
law confl icts with federal law in either of  two ways:  if  it is impossible 
to comply with both state and federal regulations at the same time, or if  
35 Id. at 280.
36 U.S. Const., Amend. X.  
37 U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.  See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) 
(“The Government of  the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject 
of  immigration and the status of  aliens. This authority rests, in part, on the National 
Government’s constitutional power to ‘establish an uniform Rule of  Naturalization,’ and 
its inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations.”) 
(citations omitted).
38 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
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state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of  the purposes and 
objectives of  Congress.39 De Canas concerned a California law that prohibited 
the employment of  unauthorized workers at a time when federal law had yet 
to impose sanctions for such acts. The Court held that because the federal 
government had not legislated in the area of  employer sanctions, the states 
were free to do so, as long as the state regulation at issue did not create a 
confl ict with federal law.40
2. STATE AND LOCAL LAWS AIMED AT “ATTRITION THROUGH ENFORCEMENT”
The constitutional framework described above has shaped the strategies 
that state and local lawmakers have pursued in enacting laws aimed at 
discouraging unauthorized immigration.  These measures have focused 
on areas in which the federal government and the states have overlapping 
authority, such as housing, education, employment, and criminal law. 
The contemporary history of  state and local anti-immigrant legislation 
can be traced back to 1994, when California voters approved a ballot initiative, 
Proposition 187, which prohibited unauthorized immigrants from attending 
public schools or accessing several types of  public services, including 
publicly funded non-emergency medical assistance. The stated purpose of  
Proposition 187 was to “provide for cooperation between [the] agencies of  
state and local government with the federal government, and to establish 
a system of  required notifi cation by and between such agencies to prevent 
illegal aliens in the United States from receiving benefi ts or public services in 
the State of  California.”41 A federal court invalidated most of  the provisions 
of  Proposition 187, holding that they constituted impermissible attempts to 
regulate immigration and were preempted by federal law.42 The court also 
held that Prop. 187 clearly confl icted with the 1982 Supreme Court decision 
Plyler v. Doe, which established that all children in the United States have the 
right to attend public elementary and secondary schools regardless of  their 
immigration status.43 
39 Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2501.
40 De Canas, 424 U.S. at 363.
41 League of  United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D. Cal. 1995), on 
reconsideration in part, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (quoting Prop. 187).
42 Id. 
43 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
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Although Proposition 187 never went into effect, it introduced into the 
political lexicon a new term: “self-deportation,” the notion that states and 
municipalities can take immigration policy into their own hands by making 
life so diffi cult for unauthorized migrants that they will choose to leave.  In 
the words of  Pete Wilson, then-governor of  California:  “If  it’s clear to you 
that you cannot be employed, and that you and your family are ineligible for 
services, you will self-deport.”44 This concept of  self-deportation faded from 
view somewhat after Proposition 187 was invalidated, but it was revived a 
few years later under a new phrase – “attrition through enforcement”45 – and 
gained newfound prominence between 2006 and 2011 as a wave of  such 
measures were adopted in jurisdictions around the country. The fi rst attempt 
to pass an “attrition through enforcement” law was a ballot measure that 
restrictionist advocates proposed in the city of  San Bernardino, California, 
in 2006. The proposed measure would have denied city funds and business 
permits to businesses that employed undocumented immigrants; allowed 
local police to seize the vehicles that employers used to pick up day laborers 
who were unauthorized immigrants; prohibited unauthorized migrants from 
renting property; and made English the only language for conducting city 
business.46 San Bernardino voters rejected the ballot measure, but it became a 
model for similar measures across the country.47
A few months later, Hazleton, Pennsylvania became the fi rst location to 
enact such a law.  Hazleton, a town in northeastern Pennsylvania, saw its 
44 SAFIRE, W., “Self-Deportation?,” N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1994.
45 For an early use of  this phrase by anti-immigration advocates, see KRIKORIAN, M, Downsizing 
Illegal Immigration: A Strategy of  Attrition Through Enforcement, Center for Immigration 
Studies, 2005, <http://cis.org/ReducingIllegalImmigration-Attrition-Enforcement>. 
See also KOBACH, K.W., “Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal 
Immigration,” Tulsa Journal of  Comparative & International Law, Vol. 15, 2008, p. 155 ff.
46 O’NEIL, K., Hazleton and Beyond: Why Communities Try to Restrict Immigration, Migration 
Policy Institute, 2010, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hazleton-and-beyond-
why-communities-try-restrict-immigration>; BUCHANAN, S. AND HOLTHOUSE, D., Rising Anti-
Immigrant Sentiments Draw Extremist Elements to Issue, Southern Poverty Law Center (Aug. 11, 
2006), <https://www.splcenter.org/fi ghting-hate/intelligence-report/2006/rising-anti-
immigrant-sentiments-draw-extremist-elements-issue>.
47 For a comprehensive list of  these measures, see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, <http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/
state-laws-related-to-immigration-and-immigrants.aspx>.
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mostly white population of  20,000 people grow by thirty percent between 
2000 and 2007, with an infl ux of  new residents that included many Latinos.48 
The mayor of  Hazleton seized on the issue of  unauthorized immigration, 
making infl ammatory claims that immigrants were linked to crime. In 2006, 
Hazleton enacted the Illegal Immigration Relief  Ordinance,49 garnering 
national attention.
The ordinance permitted Hazleton to suspend or revoke the business 
licenses of  employers who were found to have hired unauthorized workers, 
and it required certain employers (those who received government contracts 
and those who had a history of  employing unauthorized workers) to 
participate in a federal employment authorization verifi cation program that 
was then called the Basic Pilot Program.50 (Later renamed E-Verify, this 
program allows employers to contact DHS electronically to check the validity 
of  an individual’s employment authorization documents; under federal 
law, this program is available to employers but use of  the program is not 
required unless the employer is a government contractor.)51  The ordinance 
also required any prospective occupant of  rental housing who was over the 
age of  eighteen to seek an occupancy permit from the city government.  To 
obtain such a permit, the occupant had to show proof  of  citizenship or 
lawful immigration status.  A landlord who rented property to an occupant 
without such a permit would be subject to a fi ne of  $1000 per unauthorized 
occupant and an additional $100 per day, per unauthorized occupant under 
the violation were remedied.  Authorized occupants who permitted an 
unauthorized occupant to live with them were subject to the same fi nes.
By 2009, 42 localities across the country had enacted similar measures.52 
Meanwhile, state legislatures also began considering anti-immigrant bills.  In 
48 See CHISHTI, M. & BERGERON, C., Hazelton Immigration Ordinance That Began With a Bang Goes 
Out With a Whimper, Migration Policy Institute, 2014, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/hazleton-immigration-ordinance-began-bang-goes-out-whimper>. 
49 HAZLETON, PA., Ordinance 2006–18 (2006).
50 Id. 
51 E-Verify, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, <https://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/
about-program/history-and-milestones>. See infra Part III.C. 
52 OLIVERI, R.C., “Between A Rock and A Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal 
Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination,” Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 62, 2009, 
p. 60.  See also SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, When Mr. Kobach Comes to Town: Nativist 
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2007, Arizona passed the Legal Arizona Workers Act, which empowered 
Arizona courts to suspend or revoke the business licenses of  employers 
who knowingly or intentionally employed unauthorized workers.53  Then, in 
2010, Arizona made headlines around the world when it enacted SB 1070, 
the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act.54  The law 
made it a state criminal offense to work or seek work without being in an 
authorized status. It also created criminal penalties for employing, sheltering, 
or transporting an unauthorized migrant, and for failure to comply with a 
federal law that requires all noncitizens to register with the federal government 
and to carry their immigration papers. It required police offi cers to check a 
person’s immigration status each time they stopped someone suspected of  a 
crime, and it authorized offi cers to conduct warrantless arrests whenever they 
had probable cause to suspect someone was undocumented.
In 2011, fi ve additional states – Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South 
Carolina and Utah – enacted similar laws.55  The Alabama law, HB 56, 
arguably went furthest.  It included many provisions similar to those in SB 
1070. In addition, it barred undocumented immigrants from attending public 
colleges and universities and required that public primary and secondary 
schools check the status of  students and report annually to the state the 
number of  undocumented children enrolled.  It also prohibited state courts 
from enforcing any contract to which an undocumented immigrant was a 
party, provided the other party had direct or constructive knowledge of  
the person’s unauthorized status. As originally drafted, HB 56 prohibited 
undocumented immigrants from entering into any “business transaction” with 
any government entity in Alabama, which caused concern that unauthorized 
immigrants would be unable to obtain water, electricity, or other public 
Laws & the Communities They Damage, 2011, <https://www.splcenter.org/20110130/when-
mr-kobach-comes-town-nativist-laws-and-communities-they-damage>; CHISHTI, M. & 
BERGERON, C., Hazelton Immigration Ordinance That Began With a Bang Goes Out With a Whimper, 
Migration Policy Institute, 2014, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hazleton-
immigration-ordinance-began-bang-goes-out-whimper>. 
53 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212. 
54 2010 Arizona Sessions Laws, Chapter 113. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Az. 2010), as 
amended by House Bill 2162, 2010 Arizona Sessions Laws, Chapter 211.
55 H.R. B. 56 (Ala. 2011) (enacted); H.R. B. 87 (Ga. 2011) (enacted); H.R. B. 497  (Utah 2011) 
(enacted); S. B. 590 (Ind. 2011) (enacted); S. B. 20 (S.C. 2011) (enacted). 
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utility services; this provision was later reworded to prohibit undocumented 
immigrants from entering into a “public records transaction” (such as an 
application for a driver’s license or business license). 
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO “ATTRITION THROUGH ENFORCEMENT” LAWS
The wave of  anti-immigrant laws that swept the United States between 
2006 and 2011 captured a great deal of  attention in the news media and 
gave rise to boycotts and international condemnation.56 However, most of  
the provisions contained in these laws never went into effect. The federal 
government went to court to challenge the constitutionality of  many of  
these laws, as did immigrants’ rights organizations such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund. The central 
question in these legal challenges has been whether the laws in question are 
preempted by federal law under the framework set forth by the Supreme 
Court in De Canas v. Bica, discussed above.
A key aspect of  many of  the new “attrition through enforcement” laws 
is that state and local lawmakers have framed these measures as merely being 
mechanisms for local enforcement of  federal immigration policies rather than 
as imposing new and different restrictions at the state or local level. For 
example, an ordinance in Farmer’s Branch, Texas, that is quite similar to the 
Hazleton ordinance states that its aim is to provide “a different mechanism 
against the same ... conduct” criminalized by the federal government.57  The 
architect of  this strategy, and the drafter of  many of  these laws, is Kris Kobach, 
a former law professor and current state offi cial in Kansas who worked in the 
U.S. Department of  Justice during the administration of  President George W. 
Bush.  In a 2008 law review article, Kobach advanced the theory that states 
may impose limitations on unauthorized immigrants so long as the measures 
56 See GORDON, I. & RAJA, T., “164 Anti-Immigration Laws Passed Since 2010? A Mojo Analysis,” 
Mother Jones, Mar./Apr. 2011, <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/anti-
immigration-law-database>; KAIN, E., “Why Arizona’s Controversial Immigration Law Is Bad 
For Business,” Forbes, Apr. 27, 2012, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2012/04/27/
why-arizonas-controversial-immigration-law-is-bad-for-business/#745b7d061d64>; LACEY, 
M., “Immigration Advocates Split Over Arizona Boycott,” N.Y. Times, Sep. 14, 2011, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/us/immigration-advocates-are-split-over-arizona-
boycott.html>. 
57 FARMER’S BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2952 (2008).
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are the “mirror image” of  federal law.58  For instance, a law that creates state 
criminal penalties for providing transportation, housing, or other assistance 
to undocumented immigrants may be framed as consistent with a federal 
law that sets forth a range of  criminal penalties for bringing a person to 
the United States other than at a designated port of  entry; transporting an 
unauthorized immigrant within the United States; concealing, harboring, or 
shielding an unauthorized immigrant from detection; and encouraging or 
inducing a noncitizen to enter or reside in the United States knowing that 
such residence will be in violation of  the law.59
Although Kobach’s theory persuaded many lawmakers to enact anti-
immigrant measures, most federal courts have rejected this theory, striking 
down a number of  these laws even when they purport merely to provide 
local enforcement mechanisms for federal policies.  Below is a brief  summary 
of  the current status of  the relevant case law as of  June, 2016. While some 
questions have reached the Supreme Court, others have been considered only 
by the lower courts. When the federal appeals courts are in disagreement, the 
confl ict creates a “circuit split” that will not be resolved until such time as the 
Supreme Court takes up the issue.  In the meantime, each court’s decision 
remains binding in the geographic area of  the country over which the court 
has jurisdiction.
1. RESTRICTIONS ON HOUSING
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the validity of  laws that prohibit 
landlords from renting housing to unauthorized migrants. Three federal 
appeals courts have held that such laws are preempted by federal law and are 
therefore unconstitutional, while one federal appeals court has upheld their 
validity. 
The Court of  Appeals for the Third Circuit, with jurisdiction over 
Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, was the fi rst to consider this matter. 
In 2008, it struck down the housing provision of  the Hazleton ordinance on 
preemption grounds.  The court subsequently revisited the issue in light of  
developing case law at the Supreme Court, but reaffi rmed its earlier decision, 
58 See KOBACH, K.W., “Reinforcing the Rule of  Law: What States Can and Should Do to 
Reduce Illegal Immigration,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, Vol. 22, 2008, p. 459 ff.
59 8 U.S.C. § 1324.
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repeating in a 2013 decision its original conclusion that the Hazleton ordinance 
had impermissibly attempted to regulate immigration: 
The housing provisions of  Hazleton’s ordinances are nothing more than 
a thinly veiled attempt to regulate residency under the guise of  a regulation 
of  rental housing. By barring aliens lacking lawful immigration status from 
rental housing in Hazleton, the housing provisions go to the core of  an alien’s 
residency. States and localities have no power to regulate residency based on 
immigration status.60
The court further held that even if  the ordinance did not represent an 
attempt to regulate immigration, the provisions would be preempted because 
Congress had “occupied the fi eld” through its comprehensive laws imposing 
penalties for harboring unauthorized immigrants.61 Finally, the court concluded 
that the ordinance confl icted with federal law: “Hazleton may not unilaterally 
prohibit those lacking lawful status from living within its boundaries, without 
regard for the Executive Branch’s enforcement and policy priorities. If  every 
other state enacted similar legislation to overburden the lives of  aliens, the 
immigration scheme would be turned on its head.”62
The Fifth Circuit Court of  Appeals, with jurisdiction over Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Texas, reached the same conclusion with regard to a similar 
ordinance in Farmer’s Branch, Texas. The court held that the establishment 
of  criminal offenses based on the housing of  undocumented immigrants 
disrupted the federal immigration framework both by interfering with federal 
anti-harboring law and by allowing state offi cers to hold noncitizens in custody 
for possible unlawful presence without federal direction or supervision.63 The 
Eleventh Circuit Court of  Appeals, with jurisdiction over Alabama, Florida, 
and Georgia, also reached this conclusion with regard to Alabama’s HB 56, 
which contained a broad anti-harboring provision that included a prohibition 
on offering rental accommodation to undocumented immigrants.64 
60 Lozano v. City of  Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 315 (3d Cir. 2013).
61 Id. at 316.
62 Id. at 318 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted)
63 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of  Farmers Branch, Tex., 726 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1491 (2014). 
64 United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1288 (11th Cir. 2012)
RACHEL ROSENBLOOM
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 4, janvier-décembre 2016, pp. 13-45 31
Two other federal appeals courts – the Fourth and Ninth Circuits – have 
reached decisions that do not directly address the question of  restrictions on 
landlords but are otherwise in line with the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit 
decisions. These decisions, which are discussed below in Part III.B., interpret 
the federal anti-harboring statute to preempt state and local laws, holdings 
which strongly suggest that these courts would fi nd landlord restrictions to 
be impermissible on preemption grounds.
The only federal court of  appeals to have reached a different conclusion 
is the Eighth Circuit, which has jurisdiction over cases that arise in Arkansas, 
Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Missouri.  In 
Keller v. City of  Fremont, the court upheld the validity of  an ordinance very similar 
to the one enacted in Hazleton and Farmer’s Branch.65  The court concluded 
that “[l]aws designed to deter, or even prohibit, unlawfully present aliens from 
residing within a particular locality are not tantamount to immigration laws 
establishing who may enter or remain in the country.66 It then concluded that 
federal harboring laws were not suffi ciently comprehensive to have “occupied 
the fi eld,” and that the restrictions on landlords did not confl ict with federal 
law:  “As the rental provisions do not ‘remove’ any alien from the United 
States (or even from the City), federal immigration offi cials retain complete 
discretion to decide whether and when to pursue removal proceedings.”67
2. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSPORTATION OR HARBORING 
OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
Several of  these laws create state criminal offenses relating to the 
transportation or harboring of  undocumented immigrants.  For example, § 
5(B) of  Arizona’s SB 1070 makes it a criminal offense for a “person who 
is in violation of  a criminal offense” to “[t]ransport or move or attempt to 
transport or move an alien in [Arizona], in furtherance of  the illegal presence 
of  the alien in the United States, in a means of  transportation if  the person 
knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien has come to, has entered 
or remains in the United States in violation of  law”; to “[c]onceal, harbor or 
shield or attempt to conceal, harbor or shield an alien from detection in any 
place in [Arizona], including any building or any means of  transportation, 
65 719 F.3d 931, 940 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 34 S.Ct. 2140 (2014). 
66 Id. at 941.
67 Id. at 944.
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if  the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien has come 
to, has entered or remains in the United States in violation of  law”; or to ‘[e]
ncourage or induce an alien to come to or reside in [Arizona] if  the person 
knows or recklessly disregards the fact that such coming to, entering or 
residing in this state is or will be in violation of  law.” Georgia legislators 
enacted a law with substantially similar wording, while Alabama and South 
Carolina, in enacting SB 1070-type legislation, worded their provisions more 
broadly, to apply to anyone who engaged in such activities whether or not  the 
person was already “in violation of  a criminal offense.”
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits, which together have jurisdiction over 
thirteen states, have struck down laws that impose state penalties for 
transportation or harboring of  undocumented immigrants. In line with the 
decisions of  the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits regarding rental housing 
restrictions, these decisions have concluded that laws regarding transportation 
or harboring laws constitute impermissible attempts by states to step into 
the role of  regulating immigration; that such laws are preempted by the 
comprehensive federal legislative scheme regarding harboring; and that such 
laws confl ict with the objectives of  federal law because they interfere with 
the exercise of  discretion regarding priorities for deportation, which is a key 
element of  federal immigration policy. 68
As described above, the Eighth Circuit has disagreed with this reading of  
the federal harboring statute, concluding in Keller v. City of  Fremont that the 
federal government has not occupied the fi eld and that state and local laws 
sanctioning harboring are thus permissible. 69 The Eighth Circuit is the only 
federal appeals court to have reached this conclusion.
68 See Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of  Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1263–65 
(11th Cir.2012); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1285–87 (11th Cir.2012), cert. denied, 
133 S.Ct. 2022 (2013); United States v. South Carolina, 906 F.Supp.2d 463, 468 (D.S.C.2012), 
aff ’d, 720 F.3d 518, 2013 WL 3803464 (4th Cir. 2013); Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 
1006, 1023 (9th Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S.Ct. 1876 (2014). See also Utah Coalition of  La 
Raza v. Herbert, 26 F. Supp. 3d 1125 (D. Utah 2014) (holding that Section 10 of  H.B. 497, 
which makes it a crime to “harbor an alien for commercial or private gain,” was preempted 
by federal law).
69 Keller v. City of  Fremont, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013).
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3. RESTRICTIONS ON EMPLOYMENT
There are two types of  employment-related restrictions present in 
“attrition through enforcement” laws – those directed at employers and those 
directed at immigrants themselves. Laws imposing sanctions on employers 
have met with mixed results in the courts, while those imposing penalties on 
employees have been struck down.
 Since the passage of  IRCA in 1986, federal law has required employers to 
verify that prospective workers are authorized to work, and has imposed civil 
and criminal sanctions on employers who fail to do so. To comply with the 
law, employers must check the documentation of  each employee who is hired, 
and must maintain records regarding the employee’s work authorization. In 
1997, the INS launched the Basic Pilot Program, which provided a way for 
employers to receive rapid electronic verifi cation of  a prospective employee’s 
work eligibility. 70 The program, which was initially limited to employers in 
selected states, became effective nationwide in 2004 and became accessible 
to employers via the Internet. In 2007, this system was renamed E-Verify. As 
of  2009, federal contractors have been required to use E-Verify.71 For other 
employers, the system is voluntary; federal law permits employers to continue 
to complete the process manually instead of  electronically if  they so choose. 
In Chamber of  Commerce of  U.S. vs. Whiting, the Supreme Court upheld 
the validity of  an Arizona law, the Legal Arizona Workers Act of  2007, that 
requires employers in Arizona to participate in the in E-Verify program and 
that provides for the suspension or revocation of  the business licenses of  
employers that knowingly hire unauthorized workers.72 The Court held that 
federal law did not explicitly preempt the Arizona statute because IRCA, 
although it preempts states from imposing sanctions on employers, includes 
an exception broad enough to cover the Arizona law. The preemption clause 
in question prohibits any State or local law that imposes “civil or criminal 
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who 
employ ... unauthorized aliens.”73 The Supreme Court held that the Arizona 
70 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, E-Verify, <https://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/
about-program/history-and-milestones>.
71 Id.
72 Chamber of  Commerce of  U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011).
73 8 U.S.C § 1324a(h)(2).
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law was a licensing law (because it punishes employers through suspension 
or revocation of  their business license) and was thus not preempted. The 
Court also held that the Arizona law did not confl ict with federal law because 
it tracked the requirements of  federal law and did not impose additional 
requirements on employers. Even though federal law prohibits the federal 
government from requiring employers to participate in the E-Verify program, 
the Court held that Arizona was free to impose such a requirement.
Other state and local laws that attempt to impose sanctions on employers 
have been struck down, however.  The Third Circuit Court of  Appeals, which 
had invalidated the employer sanctions in the Hazleton ordinance prior to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Chamber of  Commerce v. Whiting, reconsidered 
the case after the Supreme Court issued its decision, but reached the same 
conclusion it had before.74  The court held that the Hazleton ordinance 
confl icted with IRCA because it required employers to verify the work 
eligibility of  a much broader range of  individuals than IRCA requires, 
covering any “agreement to perform any service or work or to provide a 
certain product in exchange for valuable consideration.”75
While federal law prohibits employers from hiring unauthorized workers, 
it does not prohibit immigrants who lack employment authorization from 
seeking or accepting employment.  Citing this distinction, the Supreme Court 
in Arizona v. U.S., struck down §5(C) of  S.B. 1070, which made it a state 
misdemeanor for “an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit 
work in a public place or perform work as an employee or independent 
contractor” in Arizona.76 The Court found that “Congress made a deliberate 
choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, 
unauthorized employment” and held that § 5(C) would therefore interfere 
with the “careful balance” struck by Congress in IRCA.77
4. REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
The Supreme Court has made clear that states may not require noncitizens 
to comply with any sort of  registration system.
74 Lozano v. City of  Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S.Ct. 1491 (2014).
75 Id. at 308.
76 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–2928(C) (West Supp.2011).
77 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2504-05 (2012). 
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In Arizona v. U.S., the Supreme Court struck down Section 3 of  Arizona’s 
SB 1070, which created a state misdemeanor offense for “willful failure to 
complete or carry an alien registration document ... in violation of  8 United 
States Code section 1304(e) or 1306(a).” The reliance on federal law in the 
Arizona statute is a prime example of  the “mirror image” strategy of  linking 
state and local restrictions to federal law.  Back in 1940, the Supreme Court 
struck down a Pennsylvania law that set up a state-run registration system for 
noncitizens; in that case, Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court held that the federal 
government had the exclusive power to require such registration, and that it 
was unconstitutional for Pennsylvania to set up its own system.78  In contrast 
to the Pennsylvania law at issue in Hines v. Davidowitz, the Arizona law did not 
set up an independent registration system but rather imposed state penalties 
for violation of  federal law.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court struck it down.
The federal law in question—which has not been enforced for many 
decades79 – makes it a federal misdemeanor offense to fail to carry “any 
certifi cate of  alien registration or alien registration receipt card issued . 
. . pursuant to subsection (d) of  this section.”  Subsection (d), in turn, 
provides that “[e]very alien in the United States who has been registered 
and fi ngerprinted under the provisions of  the Alien Registration Act, 1940, 
or under the provisions of  this chapter shall be issued a certifi cate of  alien 
registration or an alien registration receipt card in such form and manner and 
at such time as shall be prescribed under regulations issued by the Attorney 
General.”80 Federal law also provides that “[a]ny alien required to apply for 
registration and to be fi ngerprinted in the United States who willfully fails or 
refuses to make such application or to be fi ngerprinted, and any parent or 
legal guardian required to apply for the registration of  any alien who willfully 
fails or refuses to fi le application for the registration of  such alien.”81 These 
provisions have their origin in a World War II-era registration program that 
fell out of  use only a few years after it began.
78 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941). 
79 See MORAWETZ, N. & FERNÁNDEZ-SILBER, N., “Immigration Law and the Myth of  
Comprehensive Registration,” U.C. Davis L. Rev., Vol. 48, 2014, p. 143.
80 8 U.S.C. § 1304(d).
81 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a).
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Rejecting the mirror image theory, the Supreme Court concluded that 
§3 of  SB 1070 represented an impermissible encroachment on the federal 
power to regulate immigration. The Court held that Congress has created 
a comprehensive legislative scheme governing the registration of  foreign 
nationals, and that states may not intrude upon this comprehensive scheme 
by imposing their own penalties relating to failure to register or to carry 
registration documents. “Federal law,” the Court held, “makes a single 
sovereign responsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unifi ed system to 
keep track of  aliens within the Nation’s borders.”82 
5. WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
In Arizona v. U.S., the Supreme Court also struck down §6 of  S.B. 
1070, which provided that a state police offi cer, “without a warrant, may 
arrest a person if  the offi cer has probable cause to believe ... [the person] 
has committed any public offense that makes [him or her] removable from 
the United States.”83 The Court noted that §6 gave greater power to state 
law enforcement offi cers than federal law gives to federal immigration 
offi cers, who must obtain warrants before arresting noncitizens suspected 
of  immigration violations except where the person in question “is likely to 
escape before a warrant can be obtained.”84 It further noted that federal law 
allows state and local law enforcement offi cers to carry out the functions of  
federal immigration offi cers only under limited circumstances, such as when 
federal authorities enter into a formal agreement with a law enforcement 
agency and provide training and supervision to the offi cers.85
The Court held that state offi cers may not be given the power to decide 
whether an alien should be detained for being removable, because the removal 
process is entrusted to the discretion of  the Federal Government.  Such a law, 
the Court concluded, “would allow the State to achieve its own immigration 
policy. The result could be unnecessary harassment of  some aliens (for 
instance, a veteran, college student, or someone assisting with a criminal 
82 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502.
83 Id. at 2505. 
84 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). 
85 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506. The federal law authorizing such collaboration is 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(g).
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investigation) whom federal offi cials determine should not be removed.”86 
Consistent with a long line of  cases stretching back to Chy Lung, the Court 
reasoned that “[d]ecisions of  this nature touch on foreign relations and must 
be made with one voice.”87
6. “SHOW ME YOUR PAPERS” PROVISIONS
The only provision of  SB 1070 that the Supreme Court declined to 
invalidate in Arizona v. U.S. was § 2(B), which requires police offi cers in 
Arizona to make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status 
of  any person they detain or arrest if  “reasonable suspicion exists that the 
person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States” and that any 
person who is arrested shall have his or her immigration status determined 
before being released.88
In reaching its decision, the Court noted that there are three limits 
contained within § 2(B): “First, a detainee is presumed not to be an alien 
unlawfully present in the United States if  he or she provides a valid Arizona 
driver’s license or similar identifi cation. Second, offi cers ‘may not consider 
race, color or national origin ... except to the extent permitted by the 
United States [and] Arizona Constitution[s].’ Third, the provisions must be 
‘implemented in a manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration, 
protecting the civil rights of  all persons and respecting the privileges and 
immunities of  United States citizens.’89  The Court acknowledged that “[d]
etaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise 
constitutional concerns”90 and that “it would disrupt the federal framework 
to put state offi cers in the position of  holding aliens in custody for possible 
unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision.”91 However, it 
concluded that the law could be read in such a way to avoid those problems, 
for example by interpreting it to require offi cers to “conduct a status check 
during the course of  an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has 
been released” without the status check prolonging the detention in any 
86 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506.
87 Id. at 2506-07.
88 ARIZ.REV.STAT. ANN. § 11–1051(B) (West 2012).
89 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507-08.
90 Id. at 2509.
91 Id.
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way.  The Court concluded that because the law had not yet gone into effect, 
there was “a basic uncertainty about what the law means and how it will 
be enforced,” and that “[a]t this stage, without the benefi t of  a defi nitive 
interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume § 
2(B) will be construed in a way that creates a confl ict with federal law.” The 
Court noted, however, that its opinion did not foreclose the possibility of  
other challenges to the law after it went into effect.92
IV. FEDERALISM AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: 
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR CHALLENGING ANTI-IMMIGRANT LAWS
 IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
As the above discussion makes clear, recent litigation on state and local 
anti-immigrant laws within the United States has turned almost exclusively 
on questions of  federalism (i.e. competence); U.S. courts that have struck 
down state and local anti-immigrant laws have done so on the grounds that 
such laws impermissibly encroach on federal power. However, laws that 
single out undocumented immigrants and block access to basic services also 
raise questions of  fundamental rights under both domestic and international 
law, including the right to equal protection/non-discrimination, the right to 
housing, the right to health, the right to education, the right to family life, 
and the right to dignity.  This section offers a brief  comparison between the 
United States and the European Union in order to highlight the difference 
between addressing such laws as matters of  federalism and addressing them 
as violations of  fundamental rights. 
Federalism
From a federalism standpoint, there are certain superfi cial parallels to 
be drawn between the United States and the E.U. with regard to laws that 
restrict the rights of  undocumented immigrants. Both the United States 
and the EU have policies at the federal level that are designed to discourage 
unauthorized immigration. In the United States these include the employer 
sanctions provisions of  IRCA and the federal law prohibiting the harboring 
or transportation of  unauthorized immigrants, both of  which have been 
cited by courts as reasons to strike down subfederal laws that ostensibly have 
92 Id. at 2510.
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similar aims. In the EU, federal policies include the 2009 Employer Sanctions 
Directive,93 which established an E.U. policy of  prohibiting employers 
from hiring unauthorized workers, and the 2002 Facilitation Directive and 
accompanying Council Framework Decision, which established a policy of  
sanctioning those who assist undocumented immigrants to enter or remain 
in E.U. Member States.94
In addition, in both the United States and the E.U., numerous laws 
restricting the rights of  undocumented immigrants have been enacted at the 
subfederal level – by states and municipalities in the United States, and by 
Member States within the E.U..95  In some cases, national laws within the 
E.U. look quite similar to anti-immigrant laws that have been struck down 
by U.S. courts.  For example, landlords are prohibited from renting property 
to undocumented immigrants in Italy, France, Germany, Greece, Denmark, 
Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic, and Malta.96 The United Kingdom 
93 Directive 2009/52/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  18 June 2009 
providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of  illegally 
staying third-country nationals., OJ L 168, of  30.6.2009, pp. 24-32.
94 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of  28 November 2002 defi ning the facilitation of  
unauthorised entry, transit and residence (Facilitation Directive); Council Framework 
Decision of  28 November 2002 on the strengthening of  the penal framework to prevent the 
facilitation of  unauthorised entry, transit and residence.
95 Questions of  federalism do sometimes arise within E.U. Member States with regard to such 
issues.  However, the dynamic on display in U.S. litigation (a federal government seeking to 
block restrictive legislation at the state or local level) has not been very much in evidence.  For 
an example of  a federalism confl ict in which a subfederal unit of  government seeks to expand 
protections for undocumented immigrants, see, e.g. SOBRINO GUIJARRO, I., “Constitutional 
Bases in the Federal Confl ict Over Access to Health Care of  Undocumented Immigrants 
in Spain,” Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 6, issue 2, 2014, <http://www.on-federalism.eu/
index.php/articles/183-constitutional-bases-in-the-federal-confl ict-over-access-to-health-
care-of-undocumented-immigrants-in-spain>(analyzing confl ict between Autonomous 
Communities and federal government in Spain regarding national policy restricting access 
to health care).
96 See CARRERA, S. & PARKIN, J., Protecting and Delivering Fundamental Rights of  Irregular Migrants 
at Local and Regional Levels in the European Union, Centre for European Policy Studies, p. 14, 
<http://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/studies/Documents/protecting-fundamental-
rights-irregular-migrants.pdf  >. French law contains an exception for those who accommodate 
a close relative, and in Italy, landlords are punished for renting to an undocumented tenant 
only if  they take “unfair advantage” of  the tenant’s vulnerable situation.  CARRERA, S., ET. 
AL., Fit for Purpose?  The Facilitation Directive and the Criminalisation of  humanitarian 
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(soon to exit the E.U.) imposed such restrictions through passage of  the 
Immigration Act of  2014.97 While public elementary and secondary education 
is generally accessible to undocumented immigrants within the E.U., there 
are several Member States that impose limits on education or require public 
schools to report the presence of  undocumented immigrants within their 
student body.98
Beyond these parallels, however, the federalism analyses diverge. The 
E.U. is a federation of  sovereign nations, any of  which may (as the recent 
“Brexit” vote makes clear) choose to leave the Union at any time.  It does 
not possess anything close to the power to preempt subfederal laws that the 
United States federal government wields under the Supremacy Clause of  the 
U.S. Constitution.99 E.U. competence on migration was established with the 
entry into force of  the Treaty of  Amsterdam in 1999, and was signifi cantly 
strengthened by the Treaty of  Lisbon in 2009.100  However, migration is an 
issue of  shared competence and is subject to the principle of  subsidiarity, 
under which “the Union shall act only if  and insofar as the objectives of  
the proposed action cannot be suffi ciently achieved by the Member States, 
assistance to irregular migrants, European Parliament, 2016, p. 31, <http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/536490/IPOL_STU(2016)536490_EN.pdf>
97 Home Offi ce press release, “Right to Rent Goes Live Across England,” Feb. 1, 2016, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/right-to-rent-goes-live-across-england>. The law 
requires landlords to check the papers of  all tenants over the age of  18, and to refuse to 
rent to anyone who cannot provide proof  of  authorization to be present within the UK. 
Landlords who fail to do so can be fi ned up to three thousand pounds. 
98 See FRA-EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, Fundamental Rights of  
Migrants in an Irregular Situation in the European Union, 2011, p. 87, <http://fra.europa.eu/
sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1827-FRA_2011_Migrants_in_an_irregular_situation_
EN.pdf>(noting that “[i]n fi ve countries, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden 
it appears that migrant children in an irregular situation are not always entitled to free 
state schooling” and that the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Poland guarantee access only 
to primary education, while in France, undocumented children over the age of  16 can be 
rejected from secondary schools based on school capacity). 
99 For a comprehensive comparison of  immigration federalism in the United States and the 
E.U., see DELANEY, E.F., “Justifying Power: Federalism, Immigration, and ‘Foreign Affairs,’” 
Duke Journal of  Constitutional Law and Public Policy, Vol. 8, 2013, p. 153 ff.
100 Migration falls within the Area of  Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ). For a full list 
of  E.U. competencies, see FAQ on the EU Competences and the European Commission Powers, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq>.
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either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason 
of  the scale or effects of  the proposed action, be better achieved at Union 
level.”101  In keeping with this model of  federalism, the E.U. policies aimed at 
discouraging unauthorized immigration are embodied in directives that call 
on – and in fact, require – Member States to take action. For example, the 
Facilitation Directive requires each Member State to adopt laws imposing 
sanctions on those who assist undocumented immigrants to “enter, or transit 
across, the territory of  a Member State in breach of  the laws of  the State 
concerned on the entry or transit of  aliens” and against “any person who, 
for fi nancial gain, intentionally assists a person who is not a national of  a 
Member State to reside within the territory of  a Member State in breach 
of  the laws of  the State concerned on the residence of  aliens.”102  Member 
States were given a deadline (Dec. 5, 2004) by which to enact such sanctions, 
and were directed to “communicate to the Commission the text of  the main 
provisions of  their national law which they adopt in the fi eld covered by this 
Directive, together with a table showing how the provisions of  this Directive 
correspond to the national provisions adopted.”103
Thus, federal policies in the E.U. do not preempt subfederal lawmaking 
but rather are designed to promote it. In light of  this important difference, 
the federalism arguments that have proven to be such a powerful tool for 
immigrant rights advocates in challenging state and local anti-immigrant 
legislation within the United States are unlikely to have much relevance with 
regard to laws enacted by E.U. Member States.104
Fundamental Rights
While federalism/competence arguments are likely to be much less 
signifi cant in the E.U. than in the United States, the opposite holds true for 
101 TEU, Art. 5(3)
102 Facilitation Directive, Art. 1. 
103 Facilitation Directive, Art. 4.
104 Federalism arguments may, of  course, have relevance within Member States with regard 
to confl icts between national and subnational units of  government.  See, e.g. SOBRINO 
GUIJARRO, I., “Constitutional Bases in the Federal Confl ict Over Access to Health Care of  
Undocumented Immigrants in Spain,” Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 6, issue 2, 2014, <http://
www.on-federalism.eu/index.php/articles/183-constitutional-bases-in-the-federal-confl ict-
over-access-to-health-care-of-undocumented-immigrants-in-spain>.
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arguments challenging anti-immigrant laws as violations of  fundamental 
rights.
In the United States, many commentators have argued that state and local 
anti-immigrant laws promote racial and ethnic discrimination in violation 
of  the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of  equal protection.105 However, such 
arguments have been largely absent from litigation challenging the validity of  
such laws.  During oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court regarding 
Arizona’s SB 1070, for example, the Solicitor General of  the United States 
made clear that the Obama administration was not challenging the Arizona 
law as being racially discriminatory but was merely arguing that the law 
impermissibly encroached on federal power.106 The administration’s position 
refl ected the view that it would be diffi cult to establish that the law was 
discriminatory on its face, and that therefore any challenge based on racial 
discrimination would have to rest on how the law was applied – a position 
that the Court itself  adopted in its decision.107
Critics of  laws such as SB 1070 have also argued that they violate principles 
of  non-discrimination embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination 
of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination (CERD), 108 both of  which the United 
States has ratifi ed, and that laws that prohibit undocumented immigrants 
from accessing basic necessities violate international norms of  social and 
economic rights, such as the right to housing.109 However, challenging such 
laws as violations of  international law would be exceedingly diffi cult under the 
105 U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
106 See CHACON, J.M., “The Transformation of  Immigration Federalism,” 21 William & Mary 
Bill of  Rights Journal, Vol. 21, 2012, pp. 577-78.
107 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).  A separate lawsuit has challenged 
racial profi ling by police in Maricopa County, Arizona.  See Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 
1254 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Maricopa Cty., Ariz. v. Melendres, 136 S. Ct. 799 (2016).
108 See, e.g., LEWIS, H., Human Rights Implications of  Arizona v. U.S., <http://www.scotusblog.
com/2011/07/human-rights-implications-of-arizona-v-united-states/>. The Intern-
American Commission on Human Rights expressed its concern regarding SB 1070 and the 
very similar law enacted in Alabama.  See INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
Press Release, “IACHR Expresses Concern over New Immigration Law in U.S. State of  
Alabama,” <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2011/063.asp>.  
109 See LEWIS, H. AND ROSENBLOOM, R.E., “The Boston Principles:  An Introduction,” Notre 
Dame Journal of  International, Comparative, and Human Rights Law, Vol. 1, 2011, pp. 145 ff.
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legal framework that U.S. courts apply. The U.S. ratifi cations of  the ICCPR 
and CERD include declarations that the treaties are not self-executing, 
meaning that they cannot be applied directly by U.S. courts. The prospects for 
litigating violations of  social and economic rights is even more tenuous. As 
one human rights organization has put it: “The United States stands virtually 
alone in the world as an opponent of  economic and social rights…. American 
administrations – regardless of  the broad global consensus to the contrary 
– regularly take the position that economic and social rights are merely 
‘aspirational,’ unenforceable and best approached as a policy matter leaving 
broad latitude to governments to provide or deny such rights depending on 
the political context of  the moment. On the domestic level, the United States 
provides no federal constitutional guarantees for economic and social rights, 
and has yet to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights [ICESCR].”110
Within the E.U., in contrast, such arguments can draw on a much more 
robust legal framework.  Every E.U. Member State is a party to the core 
international human rights treaties including not only the ICCPR and CERD 
but also the ICESCR and the Convention on the Rights of  the Child (CRC). 
All are party as well to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
either the original or revised European Social Charter (ESC). And all are 
party to the European Charter of  Fundamental Rights.
In particular, case law interpreting the ESC may hold some promise 
for challenging the validity of  laws that aim to prevent undocumented 
immigrants from accessing rental housing and other essentials. The scope 
of  the ESC is limited to “foreigners only in so far as they are nationals of  
other Parties lawfully resident or working regularly within the territory of  
the Party concerned.”111 Thus, challenges to the exclusion of  undocumented 
immigrants from ordinary government benefi ts programs are unlikely to 
succeed. However, the European Committee on Social Rights, which monitors 
compliance with the ESC, has interpreted its scope to reach more broadly 
when violations of  social and economic rights are severe.  For example, in 
Conference of  European Churches v. Netherlands (2014), the Committee found 
110 CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, United States, <http://www.cesr.org/section.
php?id=26>.
111 European Social Charter (Revised) Appendix, §1. 
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that the Netherlands had violated the ESC by denying emergency shelter 
and assistance to undocumented immigrants, concluding that “[w]hen human 
dignity is at stake, the restriction of  the personal scope should not be read in 
such a way as to deprive migrants in an irregular situation of  the protection 
of  their most basic rights enshrined in the Charter, nor to impair their 
fundamental rights, such as the right to life or to physical integrity or human 
dignity.”112 
A full comparison of  indirect immigration control measures in the two 
regions is outside the scope of  this article.  However, the brief  comparison 
offered here reveals that there are signifi cant parallels between the E.U. and 
the United States with regard to both federal policies aimed at discouraging 
unauthorized immigration and subfederal laws restricting the rights of  
undocumented immigrants. Due to the very different legal frameworks that 
govern both federalism and human rights in the two regions, case law from 
one jurisdiction is unlikely to be of  direct use in the other.  Nevertheless, 
further comparative scholarship on this topic would benefi t scholars and 
immigrants’ rights advocates in both regions. As foreign policy becomes a 
more central aspect of  E.U. governance,113 it is possible that the foreign policy 
112 Conference of  European Churches (CEC) v. The Netherlands (complaint), Complaint No 90/2013, 
Council of  Europe: European Committee of  Social Rights, Decision on the Merits, July 1, 
2014, § 66. 
In International Federation of  Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. France, the Committee 
concluded that France had violated the ESC in limiting the access of  low-income 
undocumented immigrant children to state-funded medical assistance. The Committee 
held that France had not violated the ESC with regard to adult undocumented immigrants, 
because the legislation in question provided access to emergency medical care for all and 
allowed undocumented immigrants to access some forts of  forms of  healthcare after being 
present in the country for three months.  However, the Committee found that any restriction 
on healthcare imposed on undocumented minors was impermissible, because Article 17 of  
the ESC (guaranteeing the right of  children to protection) is more expansive than Article 
13 (right to healthcare). The Committee concluded that Article 17 was directly inspired by 
the CRC and that “it protects in a general manner the right of  children and young persons, 
including unaccompanied minors, to care and assistance.” Complaint No. 14/2003, Decision 
on the Merits, § 36.
113 On the new rules for E.U. external action introduced by the Treaty of  Lisbon, see VAN 
ELSUWEGE, P., “EU External Action After the Collapse of  the Pillar Structure:  In Search of  
a New Balance Between Delimitation and Consistency,” Common Market Law Review, Vol. 47, 
2010, p. 987 ff.
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rationale for federal control over immigration that has been so prominent in 
U.S. jurisprudence will come to be more signifi cant within the E.U..  And U.S. 
scholars and advocates, who have in the past drawn on jurisprudence from 
the European Court of  Human Rights in crafting arguments relating to the 
rights of  noncitizens facing deportation,114 may gain new insights by studying 
developing case law in Europe regarding the economic and social rights of  
undocumented immigrants.
114 See, e.g., WISHNIE, M.J., “Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement,” U.C. 
Irvine Law Review, Vol. 2, 2012, p. 430.
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